State v. Naranjo Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 42097 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-10-2015
State v. Naranjo Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42097
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Naranjo Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42097" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5359.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5359
,r'' ........ , l,,,1·0, 
, I 
\::> 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
FREDDIE ANTHONY NARANJO,) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________ ) 
NO. 42097 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CR 2012-11597 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
HONORABLE G. RICHARD BEVAN 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
REED P. ANDERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #9307 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P .0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ................................................................................................ 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings .......................................................................................... 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ................................................................................. .4 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 5 
Because Probable Cause To Search Mr. Naranjo's Vehicle Was 
Established Only As A Result Of Officer Loos!i's Canine Partner 
Entering Mr. Naranjo's Vehicle, The District Court Erred When It 
Denied Mr. Naranjo's Motion To Suppress And His Motion 
To Reconsider ............................................................................................................ 5 
A. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 5 
B. Standard Of Review .............................................................................................. 5 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Naranjo's 
Motion To Suppress .............................................................................................. 5 
1. Officer Loosli's Drug Dog's Entry Into Mr. Naranjo's Vehicle 
Constituted An Illegal Search Because The Dog Never 
Alerted Outside The Vehicle ............................................................................ 7 
a. All The Cases Relied On By The District In Reaching Its Holding 
Are Factually Distinguishable Because Of The Dogs' Behavior 
Outside The Vehicle In Those Cases ......................................................... 8 
b. No Supreme Court Precedent Supports An "Animal Instinct" 
Exception To The Fourth Amendment.. .................................................... 13 
2. Recent United States Supreme Court Precedent Also Supports The 
Conclusion That A Dog Cannot Enter, Or Even Touch, A Vehicle 
Prior To Probable Cause Being Established .................................................. 15 
3. Any Evidence Obtained As A Result Of The Illegal Search Of 
Mr. Naranjo's Vehicle Must Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of 
Illegal Government Activity ............................................................................ 17 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 18 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .......................................................................................... 19 
ii 
Cases 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United 413 U 266 (1973) ............................... . 
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct 1409 (2013) ......................................................... 16 
Idaho Dept. of Enforcement By and Through Richardson v. $34,000 U. 
Currency, 121 Idaho 211 (Ct. App. 1991) ....................................................... 11 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) ........................................................ .7, 13 
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) ...................................................................... 6 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U 643, 81 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) ................. . 
Minnesota v. ,·utcJn.:n 508 U.S. 366 (1993) ..................................................... 6 
State v. 131 Idaho 704 (Ct. App. 1998) ................................................ . 
State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho (1990) ......................................................... 17 
State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894 (1992) ............................................................... 7 
State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426 (Ct.App.1996) ................................................... 6 
State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 17 P.3d 301 (Ct. App. 2000) .......................... 7 
State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 11 P.3d 44 (Ct. App. 2000) .................................. 14 
State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841 (1999) ................................................................. .7 
State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180 (Ct. App. 2005) ............................................. 17 
Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17 (1984) ......................................................... 6 
United States v Hutchinson, 471 F. Supp.2d 497 (M.D. Pa. 2007) ..................... 11 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) .................................................... 16 
United States v. Lyons, 486 F.3d 367 (8th Cir. 2007) ..................................... 8, 10 
United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2010) ...................................... 8, 10 
iii 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) ......................................................... 7 
United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2013) .................................... 15 
United States v. INinningham, 140 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. 1998) ............................. 9 
United States. v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1989) ................................... 8, 13 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ....................................................... 6 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ............................................... 17 
Constitutional Provisions 
Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17 ........................................................................................ 5 
U.S. Const. amend. IV ................................................................................ passim 
iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASF 
Nature of the Case 
Freddie Anthony Naranjo from the district court's denial of his motion to 
and his motion to reconsider his motion to suppress. In the district court, he 
that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because probable cause to 
search the vehicle he was driving was established only as a result of a police dog 
improperly entering that vehicle. The district court denied the motions. After a jury trial, 
Mr. Naranjo was found guilty of one count of possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine. Mr. Naranjo that the district court erred when it denied his 
motion to his motion to reconsider. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Twin Falls Police Officer Kevin Loosli was dispatched to assist a Twin Falls 
Sheriff's Deputy who had stopped Mr. Naranjo for speeding. (Tr. 11/16/12, p.5, L.26 
p.7, L.2.) After arriving on scene, Officer Loosli deployed his canine (Rocky) to perform 
a "free air sniff" around the truck that Mr. Naranjo was driving. (Tr. 7/2/13, p.16, Ls.2-5.) 
Rocky was on a leash that was approximately 36-40 inches long, and Officer Loosli 
confirmed that he was in control of the dog. (Tr. 7/2/13, p.8, Ls.8-13.) The driver's side 
window of the truck was open and, as Rocky was sniffing the door seam, he moved and 
put his head inside the truck through the open window. (Tr. 11/16/12, p.14, L.21 -p.15, 
L.9, Tr. 7/2/13, p.16, Ls.12-15.) Immediately after putting his head in the truck, Rocky 
alerted. (Tr. 7/2/13, p.16, Ls.13-16.). The district court found that this action 
established probable cause to search the truck. (Tr. 7/2/13, p.16, Ls.17-22.) During the 
search, Officer Loosli discovered a digital scale and a plastic bag. (R., p.16.) He said 
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that the scale had a "white crystal substance" on it, which tested presumptively positive 
for methamphetamine, so he arrested Mr. Naranjo for possession of methamphetamine. 
(R., p.16.) 
Mr. Naranjo was originally charged with one count of possession of a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine, and an enhancement based on the fact that this charge 
was a second offense of the uniform controlled substance act. (R., pp.64-67.) He 
pleaded not guilty, and, prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress and memorandum in 
support of that motion. (R., pp.157-163.) He argued that the car search violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights because Rocky's alert - the probable cause to search the 
vehicle - did not arise until after the dog entered the car. (R., pp.157-163.) After a 
hearing, the district court denied his motion to suppress because it found that the 
actions of Officer Loosli did not facilitate or encourage Rocky's entry into Mr. Naranjo's 
truck, and Rocky's "instinctive actions" did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
(Tr. 7/2/13, p.20, L.3- p.21, L.19; R., pp.195-196.) 
Later, Mr. Naranjo filed a memorandum in support of a motion to reconsider his 
motion to suppress. (R., pp.226-232.) At the hearing on that motion, Mr. Naranjo's 
counsel played a DVD that showed Officer Loosli and Rocky performing a sniff of 
another car where Rocky also put his head in the window after putting his paws on the 
window sill. (See Defendant's Exhibit A, Title 2, Ch.7.) Additionally, a drug canine 
expert testified about the DVD and indicated that Officer Loosli was encouraging 
Rocky's actions during the sniff depicted on the DVD. (Tr. 12/17/13, p.27, Ls.4-25.) 
Nevertheless, the district court denied the motion to reconsider. (Tr. 12/17/13, p.58, L.1 
- p.59, L.20; R., pp.257-258.) It reiterated its original finding that Officer Loosli "never 
2 
did anything to, of his own volition, direct the dog inside the vehicle by orchestrating, 
facilitating, or directing the dog to go inside." (Tr. 12/17/13, p.58, Ls.3-7.) It also cited 
to several federal circuit court of appeals cases, which held that when an officer does 
nothing to encourage or facilitate a canine's entry into a vehicle, and the entry is the 
result of a "canine's instinctive actions," a dog's entry is not a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. (Tr. 12/17/13, p.58, L.13- p.59, L.20.) 
After a trial, Mr. Naranjo was found guilty of possession of a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine. (Tr. 1/8/14, p.334, Ls.7-21.) Thereafter, he pleaded 
guilty to the charged enhancement. (Tr. 1/8/14, p.337, Ls.8-13.) The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, but suspended the 
sentence and placed Mr. Naranjo on probation for "a period of five year(s) or until all 
court costs, fines, and restitution are paid, whichever is longer .... " (R., pp.324-329.) 
Mr. Naranjo filed a Notice of Appeal that was timely from the judgment of conviction. 
(R., pp.337-340.) 
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cause was only as 
result of Officer Loosli's canine partner entering Mr. Naranjo's vehicle, did the district 
court err when it denied Mr. Naranjo's motion to suppress and his motion to reconsider? 
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ARGUMENT 
Because Probable Cause To Search Mr. Naranjo's Vehicle Was Established Only As A 
Result Of Officer Loosli's Canine Partner Entering Mr. Naranio's Vehicle, The District 
Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Naranio's Motion To Suppress And His Motion To 
Reconsider 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it denied Mr. Naranjo's motion to suppress and his 
motion to reconsider because Officer Loosli's dog put its head inside the window of the 
vehicle before it ever alerted on the vehicle. Citizens have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in 
othervvise, in 
contents of their car. Allowing any entry into a vehicle, canine or 
to establish probable cause to search the car is unconstitutional. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court employs a bifurcated 
standard. State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 708 (Ct. App. 1998). The Court accepts the 
trial court's determination of fact if supported by substantial evidence and freely reviews 
"the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." Id. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Naranjo's Motion To Suppress 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 
17 of the Idaho Constitution protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17. Thus a warrant is generally required to 
conduct a search. "Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable and the 
State bears the burden to demonstrate that a warrantless search either fell within a well-
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recognizecl exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the 
circumstances." State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 431 (Ct. App. 1996) (citation 
omitted). Accordingly, "searches and seizures 'conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated 
exceptions."' Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (quoting Thompson v. 
Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984)). 
The United States Supreme Court has held that when evidence is obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually 
precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and 
seizure. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961 ); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)). 
In this case, the district court erred in not suppressing the results of the search of 
Mr. Naranjo's car because none of the permissible exceptions to the requirement of a 
warrant applied. Probable cause to enter into a vehicle cannot arise after a warrantless 
entry into a vehicle. Here, it is undisputed that the dog's alert occurred after the dog's 
entry into Mr. Naranjo's vehicle. In all of the cases relied on by the district court, the 
dogs exhibited behavior outside the defendants' vehicles before entering the vehicles. 
In this case, the district court relied on the dog's "instinctive" action in allowing his entry 
into the vehicle, but there is no "animal instinct" exception to the requirement of a 
warrant. Finally, recent United States Supreme Court precedent supports a finding that 
the conduct in this case was an impermissible intrusion into Mr. Naranjo's property. 
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Because the dog's entry into the vehicle was warrantless, the fruits of the ensuing 
search must be excluded. 
1. Officer Loosli's Drug Dog's Entry Into Mr. Naranjo's Vehicle Constituted 
An Illegal Search Because The Dog Never Alerted Outside The Vehicle 
When a drug-sniffing dog infringes upon a "constitutionally protected interest in 
privacy" by entering a car before probable cause is established, an unlawful search has 
occurred. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (holding that a dog sniff 
performed "on the exterior of respondent's car" was not a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and noting "unless the dog sniff itself infringed respondent's constitutionally 
protected interest in privacy.") As a general rule, "[a] dog sniff along the outside of a 
motor vehicle does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment." State v. 
Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (emphasis added)). Once an officer has 
stopped a vehicle, a subsequent investigation "can ripen into probable cause as soon 
as a drug detection dog alerts on the exterior of the vehicle, justifying a search of the 
vehicle without the necessity of a warrant" based on the automobile exception. State v. 
Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843 (1999) (citing State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898 (1992) 
(emphasis added)). Therefore, only a dog's alert on the outside can provide the 
probable cause necessary to overcome the requirement of a warrant to search the 
inside. In this case, Rocky never alerted before entering the vehicle, so there was no 
probable cause prior to the entry, and thus the entry was illegal. 
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a. All The Cases Relied On By The District In Reaching Its Holding 
Are Factually Distinguishable Because Of The Dogs' Behavior 
Outside The Vehicle In Those Cases 
In denying Mr. Naranjo's motions, the district court relied on a line of federal 
circuit court of appeals cases that began with United States. v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359 
(10th Cir. 1989). (See Tr. 7/2/13, p.18, L.8-p.21, L.19, Tr. 12/17/13, p.58, L.13- p.59, 
L.14.) In Stone, the Tenth Circuit ruled that a trained canine's instinctive action of 
entering vehicle after detecting an odor did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 
364. And the later cases, which followed Stone, relied on by the district court also found 
that a canine's entry after detecting an odor were permissible. See United States v. 
Lyons, 486 F.3d 367 (8th Cir. 2007) and United States v. Pierce, 622F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 
2010). These cases are not only unsupported by United States Supreme Court 
authority, they are factually distinguishable from this case. 
In particular, in Stone, the Court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion 
because of the dog's behavior outside the vehicle. Stone, 866 F.2d at 364. In Stone, 
the dog jumped in an open hatchback of a car and "keyed" on a duffel bag after being 
let off his leash because he was circling the car and showing "interest underneath the 
rear area of the car and at the passenger door." Id. at 361. The Court specifically noted 
that "[e]ven though the police could use a trained dog to sniff the exterior of Stone's 
automobile, the dog created a troubling issue under the Fourth Amendment when it 
entered the hatchback. People have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interiors 
of their automobiles; police may not search an automobile unless they have probable 
cause to believe it contains contraband." Id. at 363 (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
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States, 413 U.S. 266, 269-270 (1973) ("Automobile or no automobile, there must be 
probable cause for the search.")). 
The Tenth Circuit ultimately held that "the dog's instinctive actions did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment" expressly because the dog's behavior during his sniff of the 
exterior of the vehicle gave the officers reasonable suspicion. Id. at 364. The Court 
held that allowing the dog to enter the vehicle was permissible because of that 
reasonable suspicion. Id. Thus, as Mr. Naranjo's counsel pointed out below, Stone is 
not on point because there it was clear that the dog was already focused on an odor 
that was "emanating" from the vehicle, and that fact was crucial to the Court's decision. 
Id. at 363-64. 
The importance of this factual distinction was underscored in a later case, where 
the Tenth Circuit explained that its holding in Stone was limited to cases where the 
officers already have reasonable suspicion the vehicle contains narcotics. See United 
States v. Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998). In Winningham, the 
defendant's vehicle was stopped on reasonable suspicion that it contained illegal aliens. 
A visual search of the interior of the vehicle revealed nothing to the officers, who then 
detained the driver for 5 to 6 minutes while waiting for a canine, which ultimately alerted 
on a vehicle vent, whereupon narcotics were discovered. Id. at 1329. The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the suppression of the evidence, finding that it violated the Fourth Amendment, 
and specifically finding that Stone did not apply: "the officers in Stone acted under 
reasonable suspicion, a circumstance underscored by our limited holding. Id. (holding, 
'[i]n these circumstances, we think the police remained within the range of activities they 
may permissibly engage in when they have reasonable suspicion to believe an 
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automobile contains narcotics."' Id. at 1331 (emphasis in original). Whether the officers 
have reasonable suspicion of narcotics in the first place is key. The Court explained, 
"[b)ecause the range of acceptable police activity in the absence of reasonable 
suspicion may differ considerably from the range of acceptable police activity in the 
presence of reasonable suspicion, we see no reason to find Stone controlling here. 
Stone is therefore distinguishable on both factual and legal grounds and is not 
controlling authority in this case." Id. In this case, because the police did not have 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Naranjo's vehicle contained narcotics prior to Rocky's 
entry, Stone is inapposite here as well. 
Similarly, in United States v. Lyons, 486 F.3d 367 (8th Cir. 2007), the Eighth 
Circuit held that a canine's entry into a car was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
because a video showed that the dog "alerted several times and nearly indicated to the 
presence of narcotics" on its initial trip around the outside of the vehicle before it stuck 
its head in the window and sat down by the front door. Id. at 370. The Court agreed 
with the district court's finding that the police officer did not facilitate the entry. Id. at 373 
And, notably, the Court of Appeals also agreed with the district court's "determination 
that the dog would have ultimately indicated on the van even if he had not stuck his 
head inside the window." Id. 
Finally, in United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit 
held that because the dog "alerted first to the exterior of Pierce's car" before he "entered 
the front seat through the open driver's door and alerted in the areas of the passenger 
seat and glove box," the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Id. at 
210 ( emphasis added). The Court said that the dog acted instinctively with no 
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encouragement and concluded that the dog's "interior sniffs, as a natural migration from 
his initial exterior sniffs, did not constitute a search requiring a warrant or probable 
cause." Id. at 214-15 (emphasis added). It went on to say that "because the video and 
testimony support the District Court's finding that Cole initially alerted to the outside of 
Pierce's car in the area of the front passenger seat, the remand that Pierce is asking for 
would inevitably result in a proforma exercise." Id. at 215. 
The Pierce Court also mentioned that it found the district court's discussion in 
United States v Hutchinson, 471 F. Supp.2d 497 (M.D. Pa. 2007) helpful. Id. at 213. 
There, the district court concluded that the plain smell doctrine would apply because 
"Zeus (the canine who entered the car in that case] made entry into the Grand Am after 
smelling the odor of marijuana - an odor he first detected outside the vehicle before he 
entered through the driver's window." Id. (emphasis added). 
Finally, an Idaho case referenced by Mr. Naranjo's counsel is factually different 
as well. Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement By and Through Richardson v. $34,000 U.S. 
Currency, 121 Idaho 211 (Ct. App. 1991 ). There, while executing an inventory search, 
a deputy walked a dog around the outside of the car, and "[w]hen the dog approached 
the corner of the trunk, he 'alerted' or became excited as he had been trained to do 
when detecting drugs." Id. at 213. The Court of Appeals held that the inventory search 
was not rendered invalid when the dog jumped into the trunk because it "initially sniffed 
the outside of the car and became excited when it detected a scent it apparently 
recognized as marijuana, cocaine, or heroin" and then "disobeyed a command and 
instinctively jumped inside when the trunk was opened .... " Id. The Court cited Stone 
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for the proposition that a "dog instinctively jumping into open hatchback when smelling 
drugs" did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. (emphasis added). 
That is not what occurred here. Here, the district court never made a finding that 
Rocky first detected an odor outside the vehicle. In fact, it impliedly found the opposite 
to be true. The district court specifically said that the facts established "that there was 
no probable cause prior to the dog putting his nose into the window." (Tr. 12/17/13, 
p.16, Ls.17-19.) Indeed, the district court noted that $34,000 U.S. Currency was 
factually distinct from this case precisely because in that case probable cause arose 
outside the vehicle, but it then found that to be a distinction without a difference. 
(Tr. 7 /2/13, p.18, Ls.13-24.) 
In this case, when asked why Rocky stuck his head in the window, Officer Loosli 
said "My dog typically, when he smells odor, will try to follow that odor to the source." 
(Tr. 7/2/13, p.7, Ls.5-8.) But there was no finding that Rocky, unlike the dogs in Pierce 
and Lyons, ever alerted outside the vehicle in response to any odor. Therefore, it is 
evident that the only reason he alerted is because of what he smelled after he stuck his 
head inside the window. The district court said that "as Officer Loosli was leading the 
dog ... to the source or having the dog follow the source, he was directed ... to sniff 
along the door seam." (Tr. 7/2/13, p.16, Ls.10-13.) The problem with this finding, and 
this language, is that the facts make it clear that Rocky had not yet alerted or even 
become excited, so there clearly was no "source" (as the word is used above) to follow 
at that point, because Rocky did not detect any source of an odor until he put his head 
in the window. Therefore, this situation is factually distinguishable from the cases the 
district court relied on. 
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b. No Supreme Court Precedent Supports An "Animal Instinct" 
Exception To The Fourth Amendment. 
The district court's reliance on Stone, Lyons, and Pierce was also problematic 
because that line of cases has a questionable underpinning. Indeed, in the case that 
clearly represents the genesis for the "instinctive action rule," the Tenth Circuit provided 
no legal reasoning or authority for its conclusion that a dog entering a car based on 
instinct is not a search. United States. v. Stone, 866 F.2d at 364. Instead, it simply 
agreed with the district court that made that same conclusion. Id. Many years later, in 
Hutchinson, the court actually pointed out this omission, stating: 
The Tenth Circuit did not provide any legal authority for its conclusion that 
a dog sniff that took place within a vehicle does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment if the dog's entry is found to be voluntary; likewise, the court 
cited no authority for the tacit proposition that a dog sniff would be 
rendered unlawful if the dog were placed in the vehicle or its entry 
facilitated by law enforcement officers. 
471 F. Supp.2d at 507. 
In Hutchinson, however, the court crafted a rule that "where a canine makes 
entry of its own accord due to its independent reaction to an odor emanating from the 
car, the plain sniff rule would apply because the dog was not aided in its sniff by an 
intervening officer and the dog detected the odor in an area in which it was lawfully 
present." Id. at 510. The court based this rule on the "plain smell/plain view" doctrine. 
Id. at 509. But as Hutchinson notes, officers must be in a lawful location for those 
doctrines to apply. Id. at 510. And inside the vehicle is not a lawful location. Therefore, 
the rule can only apply when the canine alerts outside the vehicle. 
In fact, following Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), Idaho permits a trained 
canine sniff around the vehicle if it does not extend the duration of the stop. State v. 
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Silva, -134 Idaho 848, 852-853, 11 P.3d 44, 48-49 (Ct. App. 2000). But Caballes only 
permits a dog sniff around the "exterior" of the vehicle. 543 U.S. at 409. It says nothing 
about instinctive entries into the vehicle. The minimal intrusion theory relied on by the 
Supreme Court in Caballes is limited to the exterior. 
The problem with expanding the Hutchinson ruling is that doing so would create 
a potential loophole for law enforcement because whether a dog's action is instinctive, 
or trained, or facilitated is a very complex factual finding; courts are obviously not 
trained in interpreting a dog's actions, and many times the dog sniff is not on video. 
And if the rule depends on the dog being in a place where it has a lawful right to be in 
order for the plain smell doctrine to apply, then it cannot enter the car before it alerts; it 
must alert before it enters the car. The convenient explanation for an entry before an 
alert is that canines, when they smell an odor, "will try to follow that odor to the source." 
(Tr. 7/213, p.7, Ls.7-8.) This is what Officer Loosli said when asked why Rocky put his 
head through the window. But this begs the question: if the dog smells an odor outside 
the car, why wouldn't it alert at that point and be trained and/or restrained to never enter 
the car unless specifically directed to do so? 
Expanding the Hutchinson ruling, while not allowing police to blatantly "facilitate" 
a car entry, would still allow police to give a dog enough leeway to enter an open 
window and then simply claim that the dog was "following his smell to the source of the 
odor."1 But if this process begins with the dog smelling an odor outside of the car, this 
1 The DVD that Mr. Naranjo's counsel showed at the hearing on the motion to 
reconsider, and the testimony of the drug canine expert supports this. Even though the 
video showed a different traffic stop, it was a good example of how Officer Loosli and 
Rocky worked together, and one would hope that their protocol did not vary from stop to 
stop. It is clear from the DVD that Rocky puts his head in the car as a result of Officer 
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should cause an alert, which would make entering the car unnecessary in the first place. 
Once an alert occurred, and probable cause was established, a dog could enter the car 
to assist law enforcement in finding the pinpoint source of that odor. But given the 
privacy and property interests in vehicles, canines should never be allowed to enter a 
car unless probable cause is first established. This could be easily accomplished with 
better training. And a bright line rule stating that dogs are never allowed in cars unless 
and until probable cause is established would not only eliminate this kind of a gray area, 
it would eliminate the need for the sort of credibility determinations that took place here. 
2. Recent United States Supreme Court Precedent Also Supports The 
Conclusion That A Dog Cannot Enter, Or Even Touch, A Vehicle Prior To 
Probable Cause Being Established 
As Mr. Naranjo's counsel pointed out, in light of more recent United States 
Supreme Court precedent, whether a dog can even touch a vehicle before probable 
cause is established is now questionable. ( See Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider, p.2.) Mr. Naranjo's counsel cited to the recent Ninth 
Circuit case of United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2013), where a drug 
dog "jumped up and placed his paws on the vehicle and pressed his nose against 
Thomas's toolbox." Id. at 1088. The Court said that "The government claims that it is 
frivolous for Thomas to contend that the dog's contact with his truck was a Fourth 
Loosli's actions because Officer Loosli put his hand inside the window several times. 
(Defendant's Exhibit A, Title 2, Ch.7.) In fact, Mr. Falco-Jimenez, the expert witness 
who testified regarding the DVD said that there were signs of "bad cueing" on Officer 
Loosli's behalf. (Tr. 12/17/13, p.27, Ls.7-15.) And when asked whether Rocky entered 
of his own volition, he said Officer Loosli "directed the dog to come up on the window 
several times, both on the passenger side and the driver's side" and confirmed that 
Officer Loosli was controlling Rocky's actions. (Tr. 12/17/13, p.27, Ls.16-25.) 
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Amendment search. After Jones and Jardines, his argument cannot be so easily 
dismissed." Id. at 1092.2 
In United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), the United States Supreme 
Court held that installing a GPS device on a citizen's private vehicle constituted a 
search. Id. at 949. It said that "It is important to be clear about what occurred in this 
case: The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been 
considered a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was 
adopted" Id. Similarly, in Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), the Court held 
that the use of a drug dog on a home's curtilage constituted a search. The Court stated 
"One virtue of the Fourth Amendment's property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy 
cases easy. That the officers learned what they learned only by physically intruding on 
Jardines' property to gather evidence is enough to establish that a search occurred." Id. 
at 1417-18. 
That is exactly what occurred here. Officer Loosli discovered the evidence in 
Mr. Naranjo's car only as a result of allowing Rocky to physically intrude on 
Mr. Naranjo's truck. Rocky was on a leash and certainly could have been prevented 
from putting his head in the truck. (See Tr. 11/16/12, p.14, Ls.11-15.) Thus, based on 
both older and more recent United States Supreme Court precedent, it is clear that the 
driver of a vehicle enjoys an expectation of privacy in a vehicle, and a vehicle is a piece 
of property that is protected against trespass. If there is an odor and an alert outside a 
2 The Ninth Circuit did not address the merits of this issue because it held that the 
exclusionary rule did not apply due to the good faith exception. Id. at 1093. 
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vehicle, a dog sniff can be constitutional. If a dog enters a vehicle, for any reason, 
including instinct, prior to the establishment of probable cause, United States Supreme 
Court precedent makes that an unconstitutional search. 
3. Any Evidence Obtained As A Result Of The Illegal Search Of 
Mr. Naranjo's Vehicle Must Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of Illegal 
Government Activity 
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate for 
evidence that is the fruit of illegal government activity. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990). The test is "whether, 
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is 
made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged the primary taint." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 448. 
Suppression is required if "the evidence sought to be suppressed would not have come 
to light but for the government's unconstitutional conduct." State v. Wigginton, 142 
Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Here, Officer Loosli's dog illegally entered Mr. Naranjo's vehicle. This was an 
impermissible search. Following that entry, the dog alerted, and then the officers 
searched the vehicle and discovered the evidence. Therefore, that evidence must be 
suppressed as fruit of the illegal governmental activity. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Naranjo respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's 
judgment and commitment, reverse the order denying his motion to suppress, and 
remand the case for a new trial. 
DATED this 10th day of February, 2015. 
REED P. ANDERSQN 
Deputy State Appell~te Public Defender 
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